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Abstract. For each outcome (i.e. a payoﬀ vector augmented with a coalition structure)
of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a ﬁnite sequence
of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In
order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation - which we call enforceable
dominance - is employed.
1. Introduction
For a TU-game in coalitional form, there are two fundamental and strongly linked problems:
(i) what coalitions will form, and (ii) how will the members of these coalitions distribute
their total worth. We attempt to answer these questions for a certain class of games. We
presuppose some bargaining process and show that the coalition structure core, provided
it is non-empty, comes forward as a natural candidate for a solution.
We consider a TU-game and some initial individually rational payoﬀ conﬁguration - i.e. a
coalition structure augmented with an individual rational and group rational payoﬀ vector
(Owen 1982, p236). In case some coalition could gain by acting for themselves, it can
reject this initial outcome and propose a second outcome. We impose an enforceability-
condition upon such a counter-proposal: ﬁrst, the deviating coalition is a member of the
new coalition structure; second, none of the players in the deviating coalition loose when
moving towards the new outcome; third, the new coalition structure also contains those
coalitions in the initial conﬁguration that do not shelter deviating players; and fourth,
these unaﬀected coalitions obtain the very same payoﬀs. Then again, another coalition
may reject this counter-proposal in favour of a third outcome, and so forth. Apparently,
this bargaining process turns the coalition structure core, if non-empty, into an accessible
set of outcomes:
For each outcome of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core,
there exists a ﬁnite sequence of successive ‘enforceable’ counter-proposals
that terminates in the coalition structure core.
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In the search for a dynamic foundation of the core, already Green (1974) made an im-
portant contribution. He established a ﬁnite process of successive counter-proposals that
almost surely reaches the core. Later on, Wu (1977) showed the existence of a bargaining
scheme that converges to the core and rephrased this result as the core is globally stable.
Finally, our result is a continuation of the work by Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). Formu-
lated in the language of von Neumann and Morgenstern, they proved the indirect stability
of the core: no payoﬀ allocation dominates a core outcome, and each outcome is indirectly
dominated by a core outcome. We reﬁne this stability property in two dimensions.
First, Sengupta and Sengupta (and also Green and Wu) concentrate on the core. Hence
they do not tackle problem (i). They take the coalition structure to be exogenously given
and assume that the grand coalition forms. We also consider the coalition formation process
and extend the stability result to the coalition structure core.
Second, we employ a more restrictive dominance relation based upon an enforceability
condition. Sengupta and Sengupta allow a deviating coalition to aﬀect the payoﬀs of all the
players, and thus ignore the behaviour and the motivation of the outsiders. We impose, as
already indicated, strong restrictions upon counter-proposals: the deviating players cannot
intervene in the structure and in the payoﬀs of those coalitions that are not involved when
they separate to form a coalition.
The next section collects preliminaries, introduces the coalition structure core, and deﬁnes
enforceable dominance. Section 3 studies dominating chains and proves our result. The
coalition structure core is characterised as the smallest set of outcomes that satisﬁes this
accessibility property.
2. Preliminaries
We introduce the notation and deﬁne games, outcomes, dominance, and a core concept.
As we do not assume that the grand coalition forms our notion of outcome slightly diﬀers
from the usual notion of imputation.
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a set of n players. Non-empty subsets of N are called coalitions.
A partition is a set of pairwise disjoint coalitions so that their union is N and represents
the breaking up of the grand coalition N. For a partition P = {C1,C2,...,Cm} and a
coalition C, the partners’ set P(C,P) of C in P is deﬁned as the union of those coalitions
in P that have a non-empty intersection with C:




A characteristic function v : 2N \{∅} −→ R assigns a real value to each coalition. The
pair (N,v) is said to be a transferable utility game in characteristic function form, in short,
a game. An outcome of a game (N,v) is a pair (x,P) with x in Rn and P a partition of
N. The vector x = (x1,x2,...,xn) lists the payoﬀs of each player and satisﬁes
∀i ∈ N : xi ≥ v({i}) and ∀C ∈ P : x(C) = v(C),THE COALITION STRUCTURE CORE IS ACCESSIBLE 3
with x(C) =
P
j∈C xj. The ﬁrst condition is known as individual rationality: player i will
cooperate to form a coalition only if his payoﬀ xi exceeds the amount he would get on his
own. The second condition combines feasibility and the myopic behaviour of the players,
it states that each coalition in the partition P allocates its value among its members.
Outcomes with the same payoﬀ vector are said to be payoﬀ equivalent. The set of all
outcomes is denoted by Ω(N,v).
In case the grand coalition forms, then an outcome is a pair (x,P) with P = {N},
xi ≥ v({i}), and x(N) =
P
i∈N xi = v(N). As such, outcomes generalise imputations.
Also note that Ω(N,v) is non-empty: it contains the outcome in which the grand coalition
is split up in singletons.
Now, we deﬁne an enforceable dominance relation. An interpretation and a discussion
follows. Later on, we will drop the adjective ‘enforceable’, this shall not lead to confusion.
Deﬁnition 1. Let x,y ∈ Rn and let C be a coalition. Then, vector x dominates y by C,
denoted by x >C y, if
- for each player i in C we have xi ≥ yi, and
- for at least one player i in C we have xi > yi.
Let (N,v) be a game and let a = (x,P) and b = (y,Q) be two outcomes. Then, outcome
a enforceably dominates b by C if
- P contains C,
- P contains all coalitions in Q that do not intersect C,
- the payoﬀ vector x dominates y by C, and
- the restrictions of x and y to the set of players outside P(C,Q) coincide.
Outcome a enforceably dominates b if P contains a coalition C such that a dominates b
by C.
This relation should be interpreted in a dynamic way. Let a = (x,P) dominate b = (y,Q)
by C. Then, if b is considered as the initial outcome, one can say that coalition C deviates
and enforces the new outcome a. Indeed, in order to obtain a higher total payoﬀ, coalition
C separates from its partners (and at least one member of C gets strictly better oﬀ). The
players in P(C,Q) \ C become ex-partners of C. They may reorganise themselves and
their payoﬀs might decrease when moving from b to a. In the worst case, these ex-partners
fall apart to singletons. Finally, the outsiders, i.e. the players not in P(C,Q), are left
untouched.
Deﬁnition 1 also models a merger or a breaking up. In the former case, the deviating
coalition is the union of some of the coalitions in the initial partition. In the latter case, an
initial coalition is split up into two or more subcoalitions; each subcoalition that is better
oﬀ in the new outcome can be considered as the deviating coalition.
Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) restrict their attention to the core, i.e. they assume that
the grand coalition forms. As a consequence, they employ a dominance relation at the level
of payoﬀ vectors. However, if one is also concerned with the coalition formation process,
enforceable dominance seems to be a natural and a straightforward extension. On the one
hand, the idea of enforceability strongly limits the outlook of a dominating sequence, on4 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A.K´ OCZY AND LUC LAUWERS
the other, if outcome b is dominated by a at the level of payoﬀ vectors, then there exists
an outcome a0 that enforceably dominates b. Therefore, the enforceability condition does
not aﬀect the set of undominated outcomes.
Deﬁnition 2. Let (N,v) be a game. The coalition structure core C(N,v) is the set of
outcomes no coalition can improve upon.
Equivalently, the pair (x,P) is in the coalition structure core if and only if it satisﬁes
feasibility and coalitional rationality:
- for each coalition C in P we have x(C) ≤ v(C), and
- for each coalition S we have x(S) ≥ v(S).
Note that the coalition structure core might contain payoﬀ equivalent outcomes. Also,
in case the grand coalition forms, the coalition structure core includes the core. Moreover,
the linear programming problem to obtain the coalition structure core is very similar to the
one behind the core. As a consequence the well-known Shapley-Bondareva conditions that
guarantee a non-empty core extend to the present framework. We will not use these con-
ditions. Therefore we state the result without explaining the notion of balanced collection
(Owen 1982, Chapter 8).
Let (N,v) be a game. Let v∗ be the maximum of v(P) =
P
C∈P v(C) where P runs over
all partitions of N. The number v∗ is called the value of the game (N,v). The value of a
superadditive game is equal to the value of the grand coalition.
Proposition. The coalition structure core C(N,v) of a game (N,v) with value v∗ is non-
empty if and only if for each balanced collection S we have
X
S∈S
δS v(S) ≤ v
∗,
where the real numbers δS are the balancing weights. Replace the value v∗ in the above
inequalities with the value v(N) to obtain the (stronger) conditions for a non-empty core.
3. The coalition structure core is accessible
Consider an initial outcome. If a coalition can obtain a higher payoﬀ, it is allowed to
deviate and to propose a second outcome, and so forth. This bargaining process gives rise
to a ‘dominating’ sequence. We show that for each outcome there exists a dominating
sequence that terminates in the coalition structure core. Let (N,v) be a game and let
Ω = Ω(N,v) be the set of all outcomes.
Deﬁnition 3. Let a,b ∈ Ω. Outcome a is said to be accessible from b, and we write a ← b
(or b → a), if one of the following conditions holds
- a and b are payoﬀ equivalent, or
- a sequentially dominates b, i.e. there exists a positive integer k and a sequence of
outcomes
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such that ai dominates ai−1 for i = 1,2,...,k. The integer k is said to be the length
of (or the number of steps in) the dominating sequence.
The relation ‘←’ describes a possible succession of transitions from one outcome to another.
We are interested in the outcomes that appear at the end of these sequences.
Deﬁnition 4. Let ∆ be a set of outcomes. Then, ∆ is accessible from Ω if for each b in Ω
there exists an a in ∆ such that a ← b.
Lemma. Let (N,v) be a game with a non-empty coalition structure core. Then, the
coalition structure core is accessible.
Proof. Let b0 = (y0,Q0) be an outcome that is not in C(N,v). In case b0 is dominated by
an outcome in C(N,v), the proof is done. In case no outcome in C(N,v) dominates b0, we
look for a dominating sequence that terminates in the core.1 This sequence will be denoted
by b0 → b1 → b2 → .... As a consequence, coalitions and individual payoﬀs have a double
subscript the ﬁrst one of which refers to the position in this dominating sequence.
The proof is divided into several steps. First, we indicate how to detect those players
that can be blamed for not being able to go to the core in one step. Then, we deﬁne a
sequence of suitable deviations and show that the core is reached after a ﬁnite number
of steps. As a matter of fact, we rule out the case that this dominating sequence has an
inﬁnite length.
Step 1. Deﬁning the set of overpaid players.
Interpret b0 = (y0,Q0) as the initial outcome. Let a = (x,P) be a core outcome. A player
i for which y0i > xi is said to be overpaid relative to a. Let O(b0,a) collect these overpaid
players. Since b0 is not dominated by a, the set O(b0,a) is non-empty.
Now, we consider the collection of core outcomes that minimise the number of overpaid
players. Within this collection, we look for an outcome a∗ = (x∗,P∗) that minimises the
amount overpaid y0(O0)−x∗(O0), where O0 = O(b0,a∗). We consider a∗ as a core outcome
close to b0.
Step 2. Selecting a deviating coalition.
Since the outcome b0 = (y0,Q0) is not in the core there exists at least one blocking coalition,
i.e. a coalition D for which v(D) > y0(D). We select a deviating coalition D as follows.
First, we inspect the coalitions in the partition P∗ and we look for a blocking coalition
D among P∗. Next, if the partition P∗ does not contain a blocking coalition, then the
outcome b0 satisﬁes y0(N) = v∗ and is said to be eﬃcient (with respect to P∗), v∗ is the
value of the game. In that case we select a minimal (for inclusion) blocking coalition.
Step 3. Deﬁning a deviating outcome.
In order to deﬁne the payoﬀ vector in the deviating outcome b1 = (y1,Q1) we consider the
diﬀerent types of players separately.
First, we deal with the deviating players. Since D blocks b0 and a∗ is a core outcome, we
1In this proof we use the term ‘core’ as a shorthand for ‘coalition structure core’.6 L´ ASZL´ O ´ A.K´ OCZY AND LUC LAUWERS
know that y0(D) < v(D) ≤ x∗(D). Let i ∈ D. The payoﬀ y1i depends upon whether or
not D contains overpaid players.
(1) If D does not contain overpaid players, then we deﬁne
y1i = y0i + δi(D) ≤ x
∗
i,
with δi(D) non-negative and adding up to δ(D) = v(D) − y0(D).




|D ∩O0| [v(D) − y(D)] in case i is overpaid,
y0i in case i is not overpaid.
In words, the deviating coalition divides the surplus v(D) − y0(D) among its members.
The overpaid players are served ﬁrst and consume the whole surplus. The non-overpaid
players experience either a status quo or an improvement.
Secondly, the ex-partners of D are assumed to split up into singletons. Hence, each
player i in P(D,Q0)\D receives his value v({i}) as payoﬀ.2
Thirdly, the outsiders remain untouched: if i / ∈ P(D,Q0), then y1i = y0i.
In conclusion: when moving from b0 to b1, the overpaid ex-partners of D become non-
overpaid. In case b1 is either a core outcome or dominated by a core outcome, the proof
ﬁnishes. Otherwise, execute the next steps.
Step 4. An iteration.
We denote the set O(b1,a∗) of overpaid players in the outcome b1 by O1. This set O1
is a subset of O0. We repeat Steps 2 and 3 and we generate a dominating sequence
b0 → b1 → b2 → ... of outcomes and a corresponding sequence O0 ⊇ O1 ⊇ O2 ⊇ ... of sets
of overpaid players. If the core is reached after a ﬁnite number of steps, then the iteration
stops and the proof is done. Otherwise, we end up with an inﬁnite dominating sequence
{bk }k=0,1,2,... each outcome bk being outside the core and not dominated by the core.
Step 5. Inspecting the inﬁnite sequence.
As the core is not reached the set of overpaid players ﬁnds its non-empty minimal form
after a ﬁnite number of steps. Denote this set by O. The iteration procedure is unable
to reduce O. Due to the selection criteria for the deviating coalition (Step 2) there is
somewhere in the sequence an outcome bt = (yt,Pt) that is eﬃcient with respect to P∗ and
satisﬁes Ot = O. Let us replace bt with b = (y = yt , P∗).
We claim that the outcome b is in the core. Denote the partners’ set of the overpaid
players in P∗ by B, i.e. B = P(O,P∗), and the complement of B by A. Since A does not
contain overpaid players and b is eﬃcient with respect to P∗, the payoﬀ vectors y and x∗
restricted to A coincide: y|A = x∗|A .
We complete the proof of the claim by contradiction. Let D be a blocking coalition.
Obviously, D is not a subset of A. Hence D intersects B. Let ¯ D = P(D,P∗) be the
partners’ set of D. The eﬃciency of b implies that y( ¯ D) = v( ¯ D). Since O can not be
2This assumption can be relaxed. The ex-partners are allowed to reorganise themselves provided none
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reduced, the coalition D contains all the overpaid players in ¯ D. Therefore, ¯ D\D only
contains non-overpaid players and satisﬁes y( ¯ D\D) ≤ x∗( ¯ D\D). Use the eﬃciency of
the outcome b together with the fact that a∗ is a core outcome to conclude that y(D) ≥
x∗(D) ≥ v(D). Hence, D is not blocking. A contradiction. 
In order to stress the impact of the particular construction in the above proof we give
an example of a bargaining scheme that does not enter the coalition structure core.
Example. Let Γα = ({1,2,3},v) denote the three-player game, where each singleton
has value 0, each pair has value 2, and v(N) = α. Let α = 6. The core is non-empty.
Nevertheless, the next three outcomes generate a cycle of dominating outcomes:
((1,1,0),{1,2},{3}), ((1,0,1),{1,3},{2}), and ((0,1,1),{2,3},{1}).
We close this section with a characterisation of the coalition structure core.
Theorem. The coalition structure core of a game, if non-empty, is the smallest (for
inclusion) set of outcomes that satisﬁes accessibility.
Proof. Accessibility follows from the previous lemma. Furthermore, each outcome in the
coalition structure core is undominated. This implies minimality. 
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